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Is Materialism a Consequence of Natural Science?1
Summary
Naturalism is neither a consequence nor a presupposition of
natural science in a threefold way: (1) the principle of matter,
(2) the principle of supervenience and (3) the principle of the
causal closure of the world are metaphysical principles. They
are true, if naturalism is true. So, if you are a naturalist, you
should find reasons for your worldview which are independent
from natural science. But it is hard to see how this could work.
Key words: the principle of matter — the principle of
supervenience — the principle of the causal closure of the
world
If you think of naturalism you immediately think of the natu-
ralization of human beings. You think of what has been called the
‘hard problem’ of naturalization, which means the naturalization of
1 This article constitutes an excerpt from my book: Mutschler, Halbierte Wirk-
lichkeit, (2014). Permission granted to Wydawnictwo Ignatianum: Hans-Dieter
Mutschler, Halbierte Wirklichkeit. Warum der Materialismus die Welt nicht erklärt
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the so-called ‘qualia.’ But this is not the only problem of naturaliza-
tion. You could also think of intentionality, normativity, freedom,
morality, reason or mental causation and so on.
Naturalism comes in different versions. Scientific naturalism is
the claim that everything in this world can be explained with the
help of physics, chemistry and biology only. This sort of natural-
ism is very common in the mind-brain debate and it is our concern
here. But there is also another sort of naturalism, according to which
naturalism is not restricted to the natural sciences but can make use
of all empirical sciences, psychology, sociology and history as well.
This sort of naturalism is only opposed to what they call the ‘su-
pernatural,’ which is excluded. Then there is a third sort of natural-
ism, which takes as its starting point biology only and extrapolates
this doctrine to whatever human beings do and think. The so-called
‘memes’ of Richard Dawkins are a good example for this sort of natu-
ralism.2 There are perhaps other sorts of naturalism, but let’s restrict
ourselves to scientific naturalism, which dominates the mind-brain
debate.
In this regard critics of this kind of naturalism often treat the
results of this sort of reductionism and try to show that reductionism
does not really explain what should be explained. But let’s go a step
backwards and ask a more fundamental question, one which is seldom
asked: Is naturalism a consequence of natural science?
Every naturalist will answer this question in the affirmative, but
we will see that this is not so easy.
To begin with: there have been very famous scientists who were
no naturalists, like for instance the physicists Max Planck, Albert Ein-
stein, Werner Heisenberg or Erwin Schrödinger. The same is true for
biologists like Theodosius Dobzhansky or Francisco Ayala. Ayala is
even a Catholic priest. How could this be the case if naturalism was
a consequence of natural science? If this was true it would be also
possible to be at the same time an astrologer and an astrophysicist.
2 Cf. Dawkins, Das egoistische Gen; Dawkins, Der blinde Uhrmacher .
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This never occurs. But there are even scientists who are trained in
both theology and natural science like John Polkinghorne, Ian Bar-
bour or Arthur Peacocke. How can this happen if naturalism is a con-
sequence of natural science? By the way, we will speak of ‘naturalism’
and ‘materialism’ promiscue, because from an ontological viewpoint,
both mean the same. But let’s go on in a more systematic way.
I claim that modern naturalism relies on three dogmatic princi-
ples:
(1) The principle of matter.
(2) The supervenience principle.
(3) The principle of the causal closure of the world.
All of these three principles are necessary for the naturalist
and naturalists will insist that all these principles can either be de-
rived from natural science or they might be necessary presupposi-
tions.
It is not astonishing that we have exactly these three principles,
because they form a whole: the principle (1) of matter is the basis of
everything. For the materialist it is something like the “fundamentum
inconcussum” of Descartes. The principle (2) describes the statics of
the universe, while principle (3) describes its dynamic. So they form
a whole.
On the other hand, you cannot deny a single one of them, with-
out losing sight of naturalism altogether: if you deny principle (1),
naturalism has no ontological basis. Materialists put it often like this:
everything is composed of atoms and there is nothing over and above
this basic stuff. If you deny principle (2), higher levels of organisa-
tion are no longer totally dependent on the material basis. Life or
consciousness for instance where something is “over and above” the
atoms. If you deny principle (3), causal influences of the spirit become
possible, either of the human spirit or of the spirit of God. In this case
something like agent causality becomes possible.
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So all three principles must be true, if modern scientific materi-
alism has to be true. But why should modern scientific materialism
be true?
In the subject literature, you will seldom find good reasons for
these three principles, because everybody believes, that they are true
altogether and that somebody who denies them must be a religious
fundamentalist or a neovitalist. But we will see that this is not the
case. You can deny these principles on very good grounds.
Let’s go on step by step in order to show that all of these three
principles do not follow on from natural science. In fact they are meta-
physical principles. Modern materialism is a sort of metaphysics and
has nothing to do with empirical science whatsoever.
(1) The principle of matter
It is uncontested that physics refers to matter; at least to certain
properties of matter. But properties rely on underlying substances and
it is altogether unclear what these underlying substances are.
This puzzle becomes clearer if we think of the mathematical form
of physical knowledge: we describe this knowledge by mathematical
functions which are nothing but relations, but what are the underly-
ing relates? Take for instance the simple formula of special relativity,
everybody learns at school: energy equals mass times the speed of
light to the square (E = mc2). Here you have a relation between
energy and mass. But what are mass or energy in themselves? You
don’t know. The same is true for quantum field theory for instance.
In quantum field theory a particle is nothing but an n-place relation. It
has nothing to do with Democritian substances, as was often believed
until today. By the way: there is not a single formula in physics where
the notion ‘matter’ ever occurs!
Many philosophers or even scientists think that matter is nothing
but mass, which is a parameter that occurs all the time in physics.
But this cannot be true either: if matter equals mass, then photons
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or fields are something spiritual, because they no longer belong to
the material world, which is absurd. In fact, everything that belongs
to physics, energy, entropy, mass, fields and so on, belongs to physics
and you cannot single out a certain property and identify it with what
you call ‘matter.’
So I think that the notion of ‘matter’ does not belong to physics at
all. It is part of our practical worldview. We all know what matter is. It
is a part of our everyday life. We could call it ‘folk physics,’ if we insist
in the fact that ‘folk physics’ is a general presupposition of scientific
physics and cannot be overcome by science. Every science is rooted
in what Edmund Husserl called ‘life world’ (‘Lebenswelt’).
Some physicists tried to reduce all physical entities to a singular
one. Wilhelm von Ostwald, for instance, tried to develop an energy
ontology, while Einstein himself believed in a field ontology and Carl-
Friedrich von Weizsäcker developed an information ontology. But
this does not work either. If all physical entities are only relational,
you will not find one of them as a substance for the rest. This is why
all this ontologies never succeeded.
(2) The Supervenience Principle
The supervenience principle had its origins in philosophical
ethics in order to treat the question as to whether moral values
are determined by natural values. Then it was Donald Davidson,
who introduced the supervenience principle into the mind-brain
debate.3
This principle means that in the case of two levels of organisation
the lower level determines the higher level while the contrary must
not be true. The modal force of the determination can vary: examples
for strong supervenience are nomological or logical supervenience,
an example of weak supervenience is, for instance, factual superve-
3 Cf. Davidson, Handlung und Ereignis, pp. 291–317.
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nience. So the basis determines the superstructure, but not the other
way round. That is what we call the ‘principle of multiple realizabil-
ity’ which often holds in computer science, because one and the same
sort of software runs on totally different sorts of hardware.
The supervenience principle is a metaphysical principle. It can-
not be derived from empirical science. This is clear from the outset.
No principle, that refers to the totality of things or events can ever be
justified by empirical science. On the other hand, it cannot be a nec-
essary presupposition for empirical science. In physics, for instance,
there are many systems without different levels of organisation. So
the supervenience principle cannot be applied.
In the subject literature they constantly mention the following
example, which is indeed an example of strong supervenience: the
molecules of a gas determine, according to Ludwig Boltzmann, what
we call the ‘pressure’ and ‘temperature’ of the gas. This is true, but
there are many cases where the supervenience principle does not
hold, even if you have more than one level of organisation.
If you have for instance two entangled systems in quantum the-
ory, the state of the whole system does not supervene upon the two
entangled systems separately. Or: in biology the structure and be-
haviour of organisms does not supervene upon the genes, something
that becomes clear in systems biology. Cells are often able to switch
the genes on and out. So we have a sort of downward causation,
which contradicts the supervenience principle. Or: the function of
pheromones (which means messenger molecules) does not supervene
upon the chemical structure of those pheromones. The function of
such pheromones depends on the organism as a whole. The same is
true for exaptations. Properties which have been created by evolu-
tion for a certain purpose can be used by nature for a totally different
purpose.4 Purposes never supervene upon means. This is also true
for human actions. We can always make use of the same means to
different purposes, even at the same time.
4 Cf. Gould & Vrba, Exaptation.
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It is the analytic philosopher Jaegwon Kim who dealt most with
questions of supervenience. In his books on this topic, you will never
find a single natural scientist mentioned.5 Otherwise he would have
noticed that natural science is not in favour of the supervenience
principle.
(3) The causal closure of the world
This principle means: if you have a state of the world W1, then
this state is sufficient to produce the next state W2 a state of the world
W1, then this state is sufficient to produce the next state W2. So the
world is a closed chain of causes and effects. No spiritual causes can
influence the world which is causally closed in itself. An independent
agent causality does not exist.
Here too we have the same situation as with the supervenience
principle: the principle of the causal closure of the world refers to
the totality of existing things and is as such a metaphysical, not an
empirical principle. Moreover, it can be rejected on empirical reasons:
there is a problem with Einstein’s special relativity. According to this
theory simultaneity does not exist for the whole universe. But this is
presupposed if a state of the world W1 should be sufficient to produce
the next state W2.
There are some more reasons why we should reject this principle:
like the principle of matter is not part of theoretical physics, ‘cause’
and ‘effect’ do not occur in this science. This is why Bertrand Russell
rejected the principle of causality altogether a 100 years ago. If you
read the literature on this topic, you will find that every scholar has
a different opinion on causality or no opinion at all 6. But how can we
know that the world is causally closed, if we do not know what causal-
5 Cf. Kim, Supervenience and mind; Kim, Supervenience.
6 Michael Esfeld is one of the best philosophers of physics. In his anthology on
this topic (Esfeld, Philosophie der Physik) most of the contributors avoid the notion
of ‘causality’ and the notion of ‘matter’ does not occur anywhere.
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ity is and if this notion is not part of the most fundamental doctrine
i.e., of physics?
It seems that Russell was right for the following reason. Let’s
take the same example from above: E = mc2. Most of the insights
of theoretical physics have this form of equation. Equations are sym-
metrical. If E = mc2 then for the same reason m = E/c2. The
equation works in both directions. But this is not true for cause and
effect. If c is the cause of E, then E is never the cause of c.
Many philosophers think that a cause must be energetically pow-
ered to produce its effect. But this does not seem reasonable. Take for
instance the planets moving round the sun. Why do they remain on
their elliptical curves? Why do they not fly away? It is because of the
conservation of the angular momentum; that they remain. But this
has nothing to do with an energetic input on the planets.
Everybody agrees that cause comes first and then the effect.
Many physical laws do not depend on the parameter of time. This
is another reason why they cannot be interpreted causally. A way
out seems to be thermodynamics. Here we have an arrow of time,
pointing in the direction of an increase of entropy. But if you have
a hot cup of coffee and it becomes cold, you will never say that the
coffee being hot is the cause for it being cold afterwards. This means
that the arrow of time is only a necessary condition for causality, not
a sufficient one.
But independently of physics, many questions concerning cause
and effect are totally unclear. What are the relates of the causal re-
lation? States, events, facts, things, persons? What is the nature of
the relation? Does it depend on deterministic or statistical laws? Do
forms of singular causation exist and so on?
If you think of statistical laws like in quantum physics, in
medicine or in psychology, the principle of the causal closure im-
mediately becomes lost, because then the effect is no longer neces-
sitated by the cause, but the cause only increases the probability of
the effect.
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There are philosophers like Peter Strawson and Georg von
Wright7 who believe that the origin of cause and effect lies in human
actions (this resembles the origin of the notion of ‘matter’). If this is
the case, the principle of the causal closure of the world breaks down,
because we do not know any natural laws of human actions.
Perhaps the naturalist will answer: causality is not the result of
natural science, but a necessary presupposition. If you do not take this
principle for granted, natural science becomes impossible. This is true,
but the meaning of this principle is not ontological in kind, it is an
epistemic principle, something like a norm of scientific investigation:
if you have a material effect, you should search for a sufficient material
cause. But from the ‘should’ the ‘is’ does not follow.
Consequences
If what has been said is true what are the consequences? First
of all, if ‘matter’ is not a scientific notion, a materialistic worldview is
not scientific either. Second, if the same holds for the notion of ‘cause’
and ‘effect,’ the mind-brain debate changes dramatically.
It was the philosopher Peter Bieri who invented three principles,
only two of which are logically compatible. In most textbooks con-
cerning the mind-brain debate, these three principles are quoted at
the beginning:
1) Mental and physical events are different in kind;
2) Mental events are causally efficient;
3) The physical world is causally closed.8
This is the starting point of most of the textbooks concerning the
mind-brain debate. Then usually it goes on like this: since only two
of these principles are logically compatible, you must first choose the
7 Cf. Strawson, Analyse und Metaphysik; von Wright, Causality and determinism.
8 Cf. Bieri, Analytische Philosophie des Geistes, p. 5.
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one which is most important. This it seems, is principle 3), because it
is necessarily linked with natural science. Then you have the choice
between 2) and 3). You will choose principle 2), because our social life
depends on the truth of this principle. So you must drop principle 1):
mind and matter are not different from an ontological viewpoint. So
it follows (or seems to follow), that materialism is the only reasonable
choice.
But if what has been said is true then principle 3) is only an epis-
temic principle, not an ontological one. In this case you must make no
choice: all of these three principles are easily compatible and materi-
alism is no longer without an alternative. But the question as to how
this alternative looks, is not easily answered. If materialistic monism
is false, it does not follow that substance dualism is true. Perhaps
a weaker sort of dualism like aspect dualism will also do the job. It
might be advisable to come back to Aristotle!
Streszczenie
Naturalizm nie jest ani konsekwencją, ani założeniem nauk
przyrodniczych z trzech powodów: (1) zasady materii, (2) za-
sady superweniencji i (3) zasady przyczynowego domknięcia
świata, które są zasadami metafizycznymi. Są one prawdziwe,
jeśli naturalizm jest prawdziwy. Tak więc, jeśli jesteś przy-
rodnikiem, powinieneś znaleźć przesłanki leżące u podstaw
twojego światopoglądu. A to jest trudne zadanie.
Słowa kluczowe: zasada materii — zasada superweniencji —
zasada przyczynowego domknięcia świata
Literature
Bieri, P., [ed.] Analytische Philosophie des Geistes, Bodenheim:
Athenäum Hain Hanstein, 1993.
Davidson, D., Handlung und Ereignis, Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp,
1990.
Is Materialism a Consequence of Natural Science? 149
Dawkins, R., Das egoistische Gen, [Trans. by] K. de Sousa Ferreira,
Berlin, Heidelberg, New York: Springer-Verlag, 1978.
Dawkins, R., Der blinde Uhrmacher. Ein Plädoyer für den
Darwinismus, [Trans. by] K. de Sousa Ferreira, München:
Kindler Verlag, 1987.
Esfeld, M., [ed.] Philosophie der Physik, Frankfurt am Main:
Suhrkamp, 2012.
Gould, S. J. & E. S. Vrba, Exaptation — a missing term in the science of




Kim, J., [ed.] Supervenience, Trowbridge, Wiltshire: The Cromwell
Press, 2002.
Kim, J., Supervenience and mind. Selected philosophical essays,
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993.
Mutschler, H.-D., Halbierte Wirklichkeit. Warum der Materialismus
die Welt nicht erklärt, Kevelaer: Butzon & Bercker, 2014.
Strawson, P. F., Analyse und Metaphysik. Eine Einführung in die
Philosophie, [Trans. by] C. Hochkeppel, München: Deutscher
Taschenbuch Verlag, 1994.
von Wright, G. H., Causality and determinism, New York, London:
Columbia University Press, 1974.
